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Reviews
Contemporary Punishment: Views, Explanations and Justifications.
Edited by Rudolph J. Gerber and Patrick D. McAnany. Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972. Pp. viii, 267. $15.00
This is an anthology of readings, mostly well-known ones by wellknown contemporary authors, on the aims and justifications of criminal sanctions and limitations on their operation. One of the editors is
an assistant professor of philosophy and law at the University of
Notre Dame and the other is an associate professor of criminal justice
at the University of Illinois. They were encouraged to make the
collection by the well-known criminologist, Norval Morris, who
contributes a short foreword in which he says that "It will be of use to
student, scholar and all practitioners in the criminal justice system
who care to lift their eyes from the routine path to the direction they
wish to travel".
The anthology is divided into three parts. Part I, "The Context
for Punishment", is an introductory chapter on criminal law and
criminal punishment, designed to provide the reader with a context in
which to view the problem of punishment; the first two out of the five
readings in it are, auspiciously enough, from those two masters of
articulate expression and literary charm, the late Henry Hart of
Harvard and the late Herbert L. Packer of Stanford. Part II, "Four
Basic Views on Punishment", consists of four chapters, each containing five readings, that correspond with the four classical distinctions among purposes for punishment with which even plumberlawyers and the courts are familiar: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. To the understanding of the way these
purposes differ from one another the editors have adopted a helpful
summary in their introduction (pp. 3-4) and a two to three page
prefatory note to each of the four chapters, in which they indicate, in a
very general way, what problems it deals with and what is the special
nuance of each of the readings in it. Part III, "Seeking a Unity for
Punishment Theories", much less abstract and much more pragmatic
than the selections in Part II with their, for the most part, all-ornothing approach, is "devoted to the theme of creating a working
unity among conflicting values attached to punishment and gives the
best thinking of contemporary scholars on the subject" (p. 2). A
"topic" or "subject" index would have been useful to the earnest
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seeker after knowledge like myself who wants help in placing one
not-too-familiar idea next to its opposite or parallel not-too-familiar
idea, but that is, I realize, too much to expect of two young professors
who did not set out to write a book of their own but only to collect
what in their view was the best of what others had written.
The strength of the anthology is that, out of the mass of contemporary writing by "deep thinkers" on the justification of punishment
and on what types of "treatment" are likely to be most effective and
most fair for what types of offenders and what types of offences, it
selects and puts under one cover those passages that two knowledgeable people think are the best; it saves one the trouble, that is, of
searching the literature oneself and finding, as usual, that there are x
number of articles and passages in books that really say something on
the subject and 15x more that are, in these days of "publish or
perish" and "writing for writing's sake", merely copying or making
hair-splitting refinements on the basic ones comprised in the x. What
then are its weaknesses? First, what is, for practical purposes and
practical men, its narrow range. Out of the eight propositions
(whether you agree with them or not) which the five hundred-page
1969 Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections sets out in its
eight-page introductory chapter on "The Basic Principles and Purposes of Criminal Justice", as indicating the proper scope and function of the criminal and correctional processes, the whole mass of
readings cover no more than one, viz No. 5 - "The criminal justice
process can operate to protect society only by way of (a) the deterrent
effect . .

.

. of criminal . . . sanctions; (b) correctional measures

designed to achieve the social rehabilitation of the individual; (c)
control over the offender in varying degrees" - and that, packed
with practical meat and practical thought, covers only one page.
Second, the content and manner of many of the readings - for which
it is not, of course, fair to blame the anthologists. With certain
honourable exceptions - among which I include two passages from
Packer and one from Andenaes - they are written at such a high level
of abstraction and at a distance so remote from a real man doing a real
thing that Norval Morris' student and scholar will have a hard time
following them, and his "practitioners in the criminal justice system
who care to lift their eyes from the routine path to the direction they
wish to travel" will just put them aside with a sour comment about
"'pointy-headed perfessers". Another trouble with too many of them
is the graceless style in which they are written; in that company the
quirky rant of Karl Menninger in favour of "rehabilitation" and of C.
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S. Lewis against it compel by sheer literary grace an attention they do
not deserve. Yet another trouble is the special pleading and verbal
trickery of some of the "straight philosophers".
Aren't you too contemptuous of these jurisprudes and
philosophers, Willis? Haven't you, in your pose of practical man,
forgotten that it was two abstruse and unintelligible-to-practical-men
philosophers, Adam Smith and Karl Marx, who turned out to be
world-changers by innovating ideas that, after due passage of time,
became the "obvious common sense" of the unreflecting practical
men? Perhaps so. The truth is that with one side of my face I deeply
admire those, who like the thinkers in this collection, dare to probe
deeply and accurately into fundamental ideas (the true function of all
university teachers everywhere) but with the other side of my face I
spit me of them and align myself with the practical man who looks for
short term solutions for short term problems. What seems to have
happened to me in reading this anthology and writing this review is
that the second side of my face won out over the first. For which, if an
apology is needed, I apologise.
John Willis
Dalhousie Law School

Studies in CriminalLaw andProcedure. Agincourt Ontario: Canada
Law Book Ltd., 1973. Pp vii, 195; $14.50.
This book is a collection of papers given at the Canadian Bar Association Seminar held at Montreal in 1972. The papers discuss such
disparate subjects within the criminal procedure field as corroboration, criminal discovery, arrest and bail, industrial espionage, and the
role of the trial judge in the criminal process. No attempt has been
made to link the papers in any way; rather each is presented as a
self-contained whole, unrelated except by general affiliation to the
areas of criminal procedure and evidence in criminal cases.
The evidentiary subjects examined are "Corroboration Revisited" (Mr. A. Maloney, Q.C.) and "Burden of Proof, Presumptions, and Reversals of the Burden" (Judge P. J. O'Hearn). Mr.
Maloney gives an extensive treatment of all aspects of the difficult
law on corroboration, but the reviewer found some confusion in the
paper between corroboration required as a matter of law and corroboration required as a matter of practice. Some discussion has been
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pre-empted since the paper was delivered, because the area of corroboration has been discussed in some detail by the House of Lords in
D.P.P. v. Hester ([1972] 3 All E.R. 1056) and D.P.P. v. Kilbourne
([1973] 1 All E.R. 440). Judge O'Hearn's paper is also an excellent
treatment of the law. In particular, his views on the relation between
the burden of proof and a legal presumption are interesting. In both
papers, it would have been useful to have a consideration from the
Canadian point of view of the controversial Eleventh Report on
evidence in criminal cases by the English Criminal Law Revision
Committee, but presumably pressure of time prevented the speakers
from looking at such details.
"Absolute and Conditional Discharge" (Mr. E. Greenspan) is
subtitled "The Success and Failure of an Attempt to Rectify the
Stigma of Criminality". Mr. Greenspan concludes that the introduction of a possible sentence of absolute or conditional discharge may
not be a failure, but is certainly not an unqualified success. Much of
his observation is good sense, although, regrettably, the depth of the
paper indicates that its author was again limited by time. The defects
indicated by Mr. Greenspan, while they do not strike at the heart of
the measure, relate to the effectiveness of its operation, and it is to be
hoped that Parliament will act speedily to prevent a potentially
innovative sentencing technique from failing to achieve the ends for
which it was designed.
"Industrial Espionage and the Criminal Law" (Mr. F. Kaufman, Q.C.) deals with the adequacy of the criminal law in dealing
with two areas of industrial espionage: the theft of intangibles, such
as photographed copies of confidential documents, and the application of the crime of conspiracy. Mr. Kaufman appears to suggest that
the concept of common law conspiracy can and may be used in the
area of industrial espionage. This reviewer could not disagree more
heartily. The prospect of charging "offenders" with the vague,
grab-bag offence of conspiracy to commit an act not criminal if
committed by an individual is not one to be regarded with equanimity. Mr. Kaufman points out, quite correctly, that the use of this
offence in this area may be a power for good or evil, but it is
submitted by the reviewer that more evil than good would ensue. Just
because the present enacted criminal law may be inadequate to deal
with the problems of modern industrial espionage is not sufficient
reason for the Canadian courts to fill the gap by resurrecting an
inequitable doctrine with origins in the Middle Ages. The rationale
for such a crime has been bitterly attacked, and the English Law
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Reform Commission has acknowledged this by recommending that
the crime of conspiracy be restricted to conspiracy to commit a crime.
It is interesting to note that since the writing of the paper, the Ontario
Court of Appeal has been confronted with the prosecution of industrial espionage by conspiracy to commit a crime. (R. v. Chapman and
Grange (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 84).
"The Mental Element in Criminal Law" (Mr. S. Kujawa,
Q.C.) is introduced with the protest that the topic is so broad and
all-embracing that "I found it hard to start, harder to continue, and
impossible to conclude satisfactorily." He continues "if I am going
to do anything of any potential value, I feel I must get off the beaten
track." He succeeds admirably. The perceptive and often witty
discussion that follows deals with the defence of automatism, with
comments on the relationship between law and psychiatry, and the
focus of the concept of mens rea. The depth of perception shown by
the speaker, particularly in the general introduction to the discussion
of automatism, makes worthwhile reading. In particular, the reviewer found an often ignored, but central, point in the following
passage:
"It is onto this background of uncertainty that the relatively new
but very real defence of automatism must be fitted. .

.

. The new

theory cannot be made to work unless it contains within it a unified
concept of investigation, presentation, trial, and by no means least,
correction. A substantive law cannot have real meaning taken out of
the context of its application which includes investigation, presenting
in Court, and the carrying out of the consequences which flow from
it."
The paper by Mr. Walsh, Q.C., "Discovery in the Criminal
Process", succeeds well with the practical points that it sets out to
make. Among these he stresses the importance of the interviewing of
accused and witnesses by defence counsel, gives helpful tips on the
essential information to be gained from these interviews, discusses
the need for viewing the scene of the crime, and explains the technique of cross examination and the role of defence counsel at a preliminary enquiry. Unfortunately, the obtaining of particulars and discovery of documents from the Crown, so central to criminal discovery,
receives scant attention. Where the accused, particularly in a summary case, receives a cryptic complaint, it may be argued that he is
entitled to further particulars which tell him which law he has broken,
and, with reasonable particularity, how he is accused of breaking it.
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Especially in the case of widely drafted summary offences, particulars force a specification of the range of conduct which these offences
cover. This kind of argument seems quite urgent with respect to
summary offences, but does it apply with as much force to offences
where a preliminary hearing is necessary or possible? Will requirements for particulars or stricter disclosure by defence and prosecution
at preliminary hearing have a detrimental effect in the delicate balance between Crown and accused? What effect does discovery of an
alleged confession, for example, have upon the adversary system of
criminal justice? (See Brennan, The CriminalProsecution:Sporting
Event or QuestForThe Truth?" (1963) Wash. U.L. Q. 279:Romeyko
v. Samuels (1972), 2 S.A.S.R. 529; Lafitte v. Samuels (1972), 3
S.A.S.R. 1).
Mr. Powell's paper on "Arrest and Judicial Interim Release"
sets out in exhaustive detail the state of the law in Canada. It is
surprising, in view of the controversial nature of the Bail Reform Act,
that no comment is offered as to the desirability or otherwise of this
legislation. Instead the paper is limited to describing the law as it is,
methodically and extensively. Much of the paper is an account of the
relevant statutory provisions.
The collection contains three papers dealing with the role,
power, and duties of the participants in the adversary trial. (Mr.
Justice J.Ducros, "The Role of the Trial Judge in the Criminal
Process"; Judge T. G. Bowen-Colthurst, "Working Relationships:
Crown Counsel, Defence Counsel and the Court;" and Mr. J. A.
Hoolihan, Q.C. "Ethical Standards for Defence Counsel".) Both
Mr. Justice Ducros and Mr. Hoolihan look, from different angles, at
the problem which arises where the accused disrupts his own trial.
This problem is new to Anglo-Canadian Courts. In 1973, Borrie and
Lowe found that the problem had not arisen in England, (Borrie and
Lowe, The Law of Contempt (1973) at 34), although it has in Canada.
(Linsenmeyer "Voices from Chicago - Trial Disruption and the
Court's Response" (1971), 19 Chitty's L.J. 154). Mr. Justice Ducros concludes that perhaps a standard reaction in extreme cases
should be the removal of the accused from the courtroom to a place
where he may follow the proceedings by audio and visual technology. Mr. Hoolihan stresses that defence counsel should never become involved other than to restrain his client, citing, but not commenting on, the conduct of Mr. Kunstler in the Chicago Seven Trial.
However, the reason for this view seems to have little to do with the
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relationship between accused and his counsel: "In this country, there
are adequate legal rules to ensure the rights of the accused person."
Both are standard lawyers' responses to the problem, but more
people are beginning to ask questions. Why is the accused acting in
this way? Why does he refuse to believe in the rules designed to give
him a "fair trial"? Why does he show contempt for the law in the
courtroom? What can be done with someone who refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of the law and the courts? The full answers to
questions like these, if they can be found, will perhaps show that
there is more here than can be dealt with by the deterrent sanction of
contempt. "When they speak of a courthouse as the 'Hall of Injustice', when they think that justice and equality have been subordinated to mere power, when their creduility about 'the public interest'
is breached, the whole basis on which the authority of the state rests is
eroded. Authority is then reduced to force, and no society can long
continue on that basis." (Reich, The Greening of America (1970) at
211). The reactions of Hoolihan and Ducros are typical, understandable lawyer's answers. Time will show whether they are sufficient.
The main emphasis of "Working Relationships: Crown Counsel, Defence Counsel and The Court" by Judge T. G. BowenColthurst is upon the separation of the functions of these agents in the
criminal justice process. Thus: "If you [Crown Counsel] fail to
discharge your duties properly, or if you usurp some of the duties of
the others, a miscarriage of justice may occur. A miscarriage of
justice may, of course, also occur if the police, defence counsel, or
the Courts, fail to carry out their duties properly or usurp duties other
than their own." Of particular interest to the reviewer is the discussion of the relationship between police and prosecutor. Judge
Bowen-Colthurst deals with several ways in which Crown Counsel
may exercise de facto control over police investigative behaviour.
From the practical point of view, this area is fascinating and remarks
are quite illuminating.
The subject of plea bargaining arises in four of the papers
delivered. It arises only incidentally in the Greenspan paper, where
the author observes that absolute and conditional discharge may not
be available in some plea bargain situations. Thus: ".

. .

. if an

accused is charged with the offence of rape but pleads guilty to a
lesser and included offence, such as indecent assault, which has a
maximum penalty of five years, the offender cannot benefit from an
absolute or conditional discharge because the offence of rape, which
is the 'proceeding commenced against him', has a maximum period
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of life imprisonment." In advocating that counsel should be candid
with client, court, and opponent, Mr. Hoolihan concludes that "it
may well be that the interests of the client and the administration of
justice are best served if what has occurred is placed on the record in
open court." The reader may share the reviewer's difficulty in
understanding this vague and somewhat cryptic remark.
Mr. Justice Ducros and Judge Bowen-Colthurst show definite
distaste for the practice of plea bargaining. The former maintains that
"judges should take no part in the practice of plea bargaining, since it
is contrary to the principles enunciated in the first part of this address,
the right of an accused, any accused in our system of criminal law, to
a trial, a fair and public hearing before an impartial judge." Judge
Bowen-Colthurst, from the point of view of prosecutor, is equally
emphatic: "If you and defence counsel reach an agreement as a result
of which the charge is reduced to manslaughter and the accused
pleads guilty, you are usurping the limits of your proper function."
The fact that this issue recurs throughout these papers shows that
it is gradually eating away the shield which has concealed it from
public gaze for some years. The problem with any discussion of plea
bargaining is that its merits or demerits, problems and solutions, will
depend largely upon the social context within which it works. Thus, it
has been correctly concluded that no comparison at all exists between
the English and American plea bargaining experience. (Davis,
Sentences For Sale: A New Look at PleaBargainingin England and
America (1971) Crim. L. R. 150, 218). The central question in the
societal context is whether the plea bargaining process, conducted
behind a veil, as in England and Canada, or out in the open before the
judge, or with subsequent sanction by the judge as recommended by
the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure (section 350 3(5)),
has a deleterious effect on the objectives of the criminal justice
system. Whether that is true or not in Canada has yet to be discovered. Most writing is American and English, and must be treated
with caution in Canada. Two judges, in this book, regard the practice
of plea bargaining as suspect at best. It will be interesting to see how
the subject develops.
The book under review has its limitations. Firstly, these are not
papers written for publication, but written to be spoken. Secondly,
they are all written by busy professionals, who have not the time for
research available to academic. Thirdly, the time allowed for delivery of the paper was undoubtedly a limiting factor. Within these
limits, the book is a thought-provoking collection of papers of wide
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general interest to the criminal lawyer. As in any collection of this
kind, the standard and style of treatment varies, but in this case all are
lively and interesting. The publication of papers delivered at highstandard, well-informed seminars of this kind is to be welcomed, and
it is to be hoped that the Canadian Bar Association will continue to
provide both services.
M. R. Goode
Dalhousie Law School

The Meaning of CriminalInsanity. By Herbert Fingarette. University
of California Press, 1972. Pp. 265. $10.00
"Of making many books there is no end and much study is a
weariness of the flesh." One might add in this connection that much
studying within the cloistered confines of sterile doctrine is an equal
weariness of the mind and spirit.
Herbert Fingarette, a distinguished philosopher with peripheral
interests in legal doctrine, has undertaken to add to the rapidly
mounting volume of disquisitions on the insanity defence. The book
is a timely one. President Nixon himself termed the insanity defence a
monstrosity which should not be tolerated by his version of the "law
and order" society, a society not overly concerned with a My-Lai
type massacre or a Christmas bombing of Hanoi. Herbert Fingarette
does not appear to share the President's bias, although he fails to
discuss these latter-day forms of international crimes under his
subject-headings. Here at least, if we refer to the My-Lai type
atrocity, is one area in which this reviewer might find an insanity
defence a monstrous perversion of justice. But the author does not
concern himself with that.
Dr. Fingarette develops an impressive argument for the retention of the insanity defence, at least in its traditional common law
context. To be sure, it is an insanity defence purged of the impurities
of battling lawyers who have not had the benefit of the enlightenment
furnished by Professor Fingarette in his seminar.
This is a brilliant and at times an exciting book on the verbal use
and abuse of the whole host of insanity formulations dotting the
lugubrious process of the criminal law through the centuries. Its
focus, however, is on the verbal content of the insanity defence. And
while Dr. Faustus declared "it is magic, magic that has ravished
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me", Dr. Fingarette might well say, with equal fervour, that he is
propelled into his intellectually ecstatic state by words, words,
words. Nothing in the description of Dr. Fingarette's experiences
provided by his publisher, nor anything appearing in his book, even
remotely suggests a familiarity with the courtroom process. Quite the
contrary is the case. Upon citing a courtroom experience, laboriously
extracted at second or third hand from another book drawn from a
dusty shelf, it is plain that Dr. Fingarette lacks the astuteness, based
upon elementary courtroom exposure available to the youngster one
year out of law school, to engage in a meaningful and reality-laden
interpretation of what he sees. One example should suffice, expressive of the preoccupation with the superficiality of the written word.
Dr. Fingarette quotes:
"One hospital received a patient, pre-trial, for about a threemonth observation period. It was our consultant's opinion (a
psychiatrist of thirty years' experience), concurred in by a staff
physician and myself, that the patient had 'no mental disorder'.
For some reason, the court also appointed two local private
psychiatrists to examine the man, one of whom found him to be
a schizophrenic, paranoid type, and the other called him a
paranoid state. At the trial, two psychiatrists from the hospital
testified as to the fact we found no mental disease, and the two
court-appointed psychiatrists, of course, testified as to their
findings of mental disorder. Then, the prosecution put on the
stand a fifth psychiatrist who had examined all the reports of the
four experts and had listened to their testimony, and he expressed the opinion that on the basis of all the 'facts' presented he
could find no basis for the finding of a mental disorder which
would diminish the defendant's responsibility. The jury thereupon found the man 'not guilty by reason of insanity' and 'still
insane' and committed him to the hospital which had just testified it had found him without mental disorder..... .The
patient, within two months, petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus. The hospital took the position that it was the jury's
responsibility to determine insanity, and that this took precedence over the hospital's previous findings of no mental disease. 'We further stated that, in view of the conflicting evidence
as to the patient's mental condition, we needed further time for
observation and study. As time has gone on, we have reversed
ourselves, and it is now the hospital's finding that this patient is
suffering from a type of paranoid psychosis and requires further
hospitalization."'
The author attributes these strange events to the "relative youthfulness of psychiatry as a medical science". The interpretation of any
lawyer conversant with the insanity defence would be vastly different. The facts outlined clearly demonstrated the iron determination of
the state prosecutor to defeat the insanity defence when used as a
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shield by the accused. In this context, it is clear that the hospital
psychiatrists referred to in Dr. Fingarette's text would, if they had
operated in anything like a typical North American medical setting,
have been pressured by the prosecution to make their diagnostic
findings conform to the hypothesis of guilt and the desired end of
maximal punishment. Neither is it surprising to any lawyer conversant with these practices that the very hospital which, notwithstanding some professional dissents, had propounded its institutional
judgment of no mental illness in the accused would - following an
insanity acquittal - seek to reverse this diagnosis and to reach a
result of serious mental illness, consistent with indefinite and, in all
likelihood, permanent confinement. To the lawyer with even moderate experience in the field, the psychiatric sleight of hand, as thus
described, represents a development in the fine art of perjury rarely
equalled, let alone excelled, in courtroom situations not dependent on
the alienist.
Dr. Fingarette is not even in a position to deny this conclusion,
which almost all knowledgeable lawyers will take for granted, because, it appears, he has never sullied his professional "objectivity"
by dealing with the judicial ordeal of live men and women. This good
philosopher bears not the scars of battle, but the dust of library
volumes. His handling of such volumes is magnificent. He is keen,
perceptive, lucidly analytic, and, at times, resourceful, in a form of
logic-chopping which would make a stellar representative of
medieval scholasticism swell with pride. The beauty of his exegesis
has all that the scholastic heart could hope for but, alas, to the more
young of heart, his writing appears singularly detached from the
social and political framework from which formulae of exculpatory
mental illnesses take on meaning. He has yet to learn that no rule is
self-administering and that a study of the insanity defence not
founded upon courtroom observation and indeed courtroom participation as integral parts of the scientific study of the subject, is a sad
waste of printer's ink. In a word, Dr. Fingarette has little to say about
the living reality of contemporary criminal justice.
What can one say in response to such a learned man? "Oh
knowledge, ill-inhabited, worse than Jove in a thatched house".
Richard Arens
School of Law
Temple University
Philadelphia, U.S.A.
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Libel and Slander. By Peter F. Carter-Ruck. London: Faber & Faber,
1972. Pp. 448. English price £10
The technical difficulties of the law of defamation are notorious.
Thus Russell L. J. has said: "To the comparative newcomer, the law
of libel seems to have characteristics of such complication and
subtlety that I wonder whether a jury on retiring can readily distinguish their heads from their heels" (Broadway Approvals Ltd. v.
Odhams Press Ltd. (No. 2) [1965] 1 W.L.R. 805 (C.A.), 825). In
similar vein Diplock L. J. has remarked: "Lawyers should be
ashamed that they have allowed the law of defamation to have
become bogged down in such a mass of technicalities.

. ."

(Boston

v. W. Bagshaw & Sons [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1126 (C.A.), 1135).
Perhaps technicality is inevitable when one remembers that the law of
defamation is concerned to keep a finely-adjusted balance between
protection of reputation ("good name in man or woman" being "the
immediate jewel of their souls") and freedom of speech. In some
countries this may raise great constitutional issues, as is demonstrated by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and
its progeny. It is only incidentally, however, that defamation has
provided the battleground in recent years for constitutional struggles
of a different sort: to throw off the fetters of judicial subordination to
the House of Lords. For the former British colonies the attempt was
rowned with success in AustralianConsolidatedPressLtd. v. Uren
[1969] 1 A.C. 590 (J.C.); for the English Court of Appeal the
uprising was crushed in Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C.
1027 (H.L.). (A powerful Canadian shot in this battle, again fired in
the context of a defamation suit, is to be found in McElroy v.
Cowper-Smith (1967) 62 D.L.R. (2d) 65, 71-2.)
Little of all this is apparent from the book under review.
"[D]esigned primarily to provide a comprehensive work on libel and
slander, sufficient to meet the needs of all whose livelihood depends
on the printed word" (Preface, p. 15), it smoothes the path of the
traveller through the thickets of legal technicality, avoids the pitfalls
of competing values and ignores the bullets of the judicial antagonists
which may pass overhead. It is, therefore, a useful book but hardly an
important one. While one may not doubt the usefulness, for those
"whose livelihood depends on the printed word", of the clear and
accurate exposition, in some 20 chapters, of the law of defamation in
England, some scepticism may be expressed as to the value, even for
an international publisher, of the outline - on average in little more
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than a page each - of the law of defamation in nearly 60 countries,
from Argentina to Zambia. Each of the Canadian Provinces and the
Australian States is dealt with separately, though no reason is given
as to why in the case of Australia the Northern Territory is deemed
worthy of inclusion, but not Tasmania or the Australian Capital
Territory. The section on the United States carries a warning that the
law "varies considerably between State and State", but does not
attempt to catalogue the differences. The usefulness of the book is
extended, however, by chapters on injurious falsehood (including
slander of title and of goods), obscene publications, and contempt of
court. Illustrations of the amounts of damages awarded in cases from
1951 to 1970, which are set out in Appendix IV, are, on the other
hand, only likely to confuse the reader because of the brevity of the
report of the circumstances of the publication and the fact that
defamation actions are probably too infrequent for any pattern of
awards to develop from which a scale of damages may be constructed, as has been done by the English courts in cases of personal
injury.
There is not much in Mr. Carter-Ruck's statement of the law
with which one can quarrel. Bognor Regis U.D.C. v. Campion
[1972] 2 Q.B. 169 was probably decided too late for the author to
introduce the qualification which that case requires to the paragraph
on page 86 concerning the right of a municipal corporation to sue. On
page 113 the effect of Hornal v. NeubergerProducts Ltd. [1957] 1
Q.B. 247 (C.A.) on the onus of proving a criminal offence in civil
proceedings is misstated. Although three of the seven members of the
House of Lords inBroome v. Cassell& Co. Ltd., supra, dissented on
whether the trial judge's direction was adequate, it is not true to say,
as Mr. Carter-Ruck does at page 172, that "it was held, by a majority
of only four to three, that the law as to the categories of case in which
exemplary damages might be awarded had been correctly stated by
Lord Devlin inRookes v. Barnard" [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.). Only
Viscount Dilhorne dissented on this point, though others of their
Lordships did indicate that if Lord Devlin had not spoken they
themselves would have chosen wider or narrower categories. On the
previous page (p. 171), after a discussion of special damages, it is
stated that it is for the jury to assess general damages: this may
mislead a reader into believing that the assessment of special damages is not a function of the jury.
It is surprising thatEggerv. Viscount Chelmsford [1965] 1 Q.B.
248 (C.A.) is not cited on page 216 as authority for the proposition
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that malice of one joint publisher does not destroy the qualified
privilege of another. It is still more surprising that Machado v. Fontes
[1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.) is cited on page 234 without any warning
that its authority may have been impaired by subsequent developments of the law of conflict of laws in tort: at least a reference to Boys
v. Chaplin [1971] A.C. 356 (H.L.) is called for. It is no doubt too
much to expect that a question mark be put against Mangena v.
Wright [1909] 2 K.B. 958 on page 120 in the light of Dixon J. 's view
in Bailey v. Truth & Sportsman Ltd. (1938) 60 C.L.R. 700, 721-4,
that a privileged report of untrue facts will not support a defence of
fair comment on the facts, as opposed to fair comment on the report.
It is questionable whether "most writers of legal text books are
agreed that general damages are not recoverable" in a case of slander
not actionableper se where special damage is proved (p. 180). While
this may be true of works specifically on defamation, general writers
on Torts are of the contrary opinion: see the current editions of
Salmond, Fleming and Street, and the editions of Clerk & Lindsell
before the last two (and for American authority, Prosser).McGregor
on Damages says the matter is undecided, citing a dictum either way.
However, the dictum so cited as being in favour of recovery of
general damages was relied on by the majority in Albrecht v.
Patterson (1886) 12 V.L.R. 821 (F.C.), who denied recovery
beyond the special damages proved. In any event, the matter is best
regarded as open.
On page 32 reference is made to the South African case of
International Tobacco Co. (S.A.) Ltd. v. United Tobacco Co.
(South) Ltd., the correct citation of which is 1955 (2) S.A. 1 (W). The
award of damages is said to have been £580,000 in respect of "an
imputation that [the plaintiff's] cigarettes caused cancer". Presumably the same case is referred to when on page 218, n.9, there is
mention of "the astronomical award of over £ 250,000 damages".
This action was really one for a campaign of injurious falsehood that
the cigarettes caused tuberculosis, not cancer, and the special damage
was fully proved. The award was actually £574,241 (see 1955 (2)
S.A. at p.32) and, if memory serves aright, the solution adopted by
the defendant was to take over the plaintiff rather than pay the
damages.
The Tobacco case, instead of being cited as above, is cited as
"(1955) S.A. Law Reports April 1955". This is typical of the
carelessness with which overseas authorities are cited. The citations
to the Australian cases on pages 254, 255 and 260 are not only
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unconventional, but misleading: thus Livingstone-Thomas v.
Associated Newspapers Ltd. "(1969), Pt. 1 N.S.W. Reports 223"
should be referred to as either (1969) 90 W.N. (Pt. 1) (N.S.W.) 223
(C.A.) or [1969] 1 N.S.W.R. 771 (C.A.); while without the date
Dawes v. News "S.A.S.R. 312 at 319 320" is virtually meaningless.
The problem is avoided in respect of Canadian reports, since no
Canadian cases are cited. But even with English reports conventions
are thrown to the winds. Square brackets apparently do not exist for
this publisher and consistency of punctuation is not seen to be a
virtue. The All England Reports are generally favoured over the
official Law Reports, but every now and then an "official" citation is
given as well. Why cite Jayson v. Midland Bank Ltd. as "(1967) S.J.
15th September, 1967, p. 719" instead of its affirmation in [1968] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 409 (C.A.)? Why on page 68 must two such diverse
methods be used in notes 4 and 5a for citations to reports in The
Times? Why is "ibid." sometimes used to refer back not to the
previous note, but an earlier one (pp. 173 and 222)? And one could go
on.

In fact, in a book intended for those "whose livelihood depends
on the printed word", the publisher ought to be ashamed of the
presentation. There is an average of at least one misprint in every ten
pages; in some sections many more. Even the Table of Contents does
not refer accurately to the beginning of every chapter. The tables
generally have an ugly format. It is a pity, because Mr. Carter-Ruck's
material deserved better.
Harold Luntz,
Faculty of Law
University of Melbourne.

Les Droits de l'Homme et les Libertis Publiquespar les Textes. By
Maurice Torrelli and Rene Baudouin. Montr6al: Les Presses de
l'Universit6 du Qu6bec, 1972. Pp. xxv, 387.
Recent events throughout the world have provoked a widening interest in the promotion and protection of buman rights: allegations of
genocide in South America (e.g. Brazil) and Africa (e.g. Burundi)
the explusion of Asians from Uganda; accusations against British
authorities in Ireland; repression against intellectuals and dissidents
in the Soviet Union; as well as an increasing number of bills of rights
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in national legislation. In some instances, this interest has been
sufficient to lead to the introduction of university courses concerning
human rights. Too often, however, the raw material for study,
particularly on the comparative level, has been so dispersed as to
make effective use extremely difficult, although the publication of
Brownlie's Basic Documents on Human Rights has made matters a
little easier, as have the two volumes on InternationalProtection of
Human Rights edited by Sohn and Buergenthal.
The lacuna has been further reduced by the publication of Les
Droitsde I'Homme et les Libert s Publiquespar les Textes, a collection of legal texts, both municipal and international, prepared by Drs.
Torrelli and Baudouin. Their main source is the documentation found
in the Yearbooks on Human Rights, published by the Human Rights
Division of the United Nations. There could be a drawback in this
since this material has been supplied by the countries concerned and
readers may wonder how particular items came to be included as
manifestoes directed to promoting human rights. This is particularly
clear when considering reports from such members of the United
Nations as South Africa. Because of the eclecticism of the editors,
however, readers will have little difficulty in finding material in this
collection which may reasonably be considered as legislation for the
protection of human rights.
This collection is devoted to both municipal and international
legislation. Since countries regardless of their political ideology
nowadays tend to pay at least lip service to human rights, Drs.
Torrelli and Baudouin provide a fairly wide representation of countries. The documents from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy may well
serve to remind us how easily documents on fundamental rights can
become propaganda fagades. It is interesting to note that under the
heading 'Les r6gimes dictatoriaux' they also include the 26 Points of
the Spanish Falange (1934), the Charter of the Spanish People
(1945), and the Basic Law proclaiming the Principles of the National
Movement (1958).
In addition, there are the relevant articles from the Portuguese
Constitution of 1933, which are about as realistic from the point of
view of the individual's right to freedom as the chapter reproduced
from the 1936 Soviet Constitution. From a historical point of view it
is interesting to compare these extracts, particularly chapter X of the
latter, with the 1918 Declaration of the Rights of Labouring and
Exploited Classes. The other 'dictatorial r6gimes' whose constitutions are reproduced are the Democratic Republic of Germany, and
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the People's Republic of Poland and Yugoslavia. It is perhaps a little
unfortunate that the learned editors have seen fit to list all three of
these together with the Soviet Union under the rubric 'U.R.S.S. et
Pays Satellites', particularly as no attempt is made to apply such
ideological or political subjectivism in any other case, whether in
Latin America or the Far East.
The European 'regimes libfraux' listed are Belgium - although
one would never know from this collection that there is any conflict
between the Flemings and the Walloons or that there is, as in Canada,
a fundamental conflict in respect of the national language(s); France
- beginning with the 1789 Declaration of Rights of Man and of the
Citizen and ending with the 1958 Constitution, taking in P6tain's
draft of 1940; the Federal Republic of Germany - while Germany
recognizes that persons suffering political persecution are entitled to
asylum, the same article of the Constitution protects citizens from
extradition, presumably including those wanted for hijacking (Art.
16); Great Britain- Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the abolition
of the Star Chamber, habeas corpus, the Bill of Rights and the Act of
Establishment, but omitting any reference to, for example, the Public
Order Act or the Race Relations Act; Italy; Luxembourg; the Netherlands; and Switzerland- their version of the 1874 Constitution gives
no indication that, although Art. 43 provides "1. Tout citoyen d'un
canton est citoyen suisse. 2. I1peut, ce titre, pendre part, au lieu de
son domicile, t toutes les 6lections et votations en mati6re ffd6rale,
aprs avoir dfiment justifi6 de sa qualit6 d'61ecteur", women in
Switzerland have still not received the right to vote. It is perhaps
unfortunate that no document from any of the Scandinavian countries
is included, even though Denmark, Norway and Sweden all guarantee a variety of human rights in their constitutions: Denmark (1953),
Arts. 66-85; Norway (1814), as amended, Arts, 92-109; and Sweden
(1809), Arts. 16, 85 and 114.
The first of the 'American' countries to be considered by the
editors is Canada, which is represented by the Canadian Bill of
Rights, the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights and the 1966 'Projet de
Prologue' of the Quebec Civil Code. In view of the fact that this
collection has been published by the Quebec University Press and is
the only one of its kind in Canada, in either French or English, one
might have hoped that Drs. Torrelli and Baudouin would have included the human rights legislation of some of the other Canadian
provinces, such as Ontario or British Columbia or even the 1966
Anti-Discrimination Ordinance of the North West Territories. For the
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United States there are the Declaration of Independence and selected
paragraphs from the Constitution, together with Amendments 1-19,
21 and 24. Latin America is represented by Argentina- almost with
prescience of the return of Peron, the editors have given the constitution of 1949; Brazil; Chile - the Constitution of 1925; Cuba and
Mexico. In view of the extent to which the 1946 Constitution of
Panama, as amended in 1956 is taken up with human rights, one
might have expected this document in preference to one of those
included.
Africa and the Middle East are represented by Algeria; Guinea;
Iran; Israel -

the Declaration of Independence; Kenya -

the Con-

stitution and the 1964 Law for the Protection of Foreign Investments;
Liberia - the similarities between the Constitution of 1847 and that
of the United States are, not surprisingly, somewhat close; Malagasy;
Morocco; Senegal; Togo; and the United Arab Republic. Finally, in
the section devoted to municipal legislation there is material from the
following Far Eastern countries: India; Japan - by including the
terms of surrender from the Potsdam Declaration and the 1945
Directive of the Supreme Commander on human rights, the background of the Constitution becomes crystal clear; Laos - the Constitution and the 1957 Law on Public Rights and Liberties; Mongolia
- surprisingly this People's Republic is not described as a Soviet
satellite; Pakistan; the Philippines; and the Republic of Vietnam apparently regarded by the editors as independent when its constitution was promulgated in 1967. Neither the Republic of China
(Taiwan) nor the People's Republic of China is included in this
collection.
In so far as international instruments are concerned, the editors
print only a selection of relevant European documents, while those
from the Organization of American States carry the story only as far
as 1954, and the material on the third world is even more rudimentary. While there is a section on enforcement with selections from a
variety of documents, it is perhaps a little surprising to find the
Stature of the World Court in this section, for its potential for the
protection of human rights is somewhat minimal. One's surprise is
intensified by the absence of such United Nations documents as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the two international
Covenants. It is also somewhat disconcerting to find the material on
the European Commission and Court, together with Protocols 3 and
2, respectively, printed separately from the European Convention
itself. As to international criminal law, the editors have reprinted the
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draft for an international criminal court annexed to the draft of the
Genocide Convention - perhaps the Report of the 1953 Committee
on International Criminal Jurisdiction to be found in the General
Assembly records might have been more relevant; the punitive articles (227-230) in the Treaty of Versailles; and what is described as the
instrument establishing the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg - the editors refer to the text as that of Law No. 10 of
December 1945 (which is what they in fact print), whereas the
Nuremberg Charter was signed in August. In fact, it might have been
more useful had they used the Resolution of the General Assembly
affirming the Nuremberg Principles.
So far as it goes, this is a useful collection. It should be brought
up to date periodically, with perhaps a little more judicious selection
- there might be more use of Canadian materials and the definition
of human rights might be so widely interpreted as to include such
legislation as the Alberta Individual Rights' Protection Act. From the
point of view of the student it is a useful adjunct to the works
mentioned earlier, while for the francophone in Canada it fills a void.
Perhaps one might express the hope that the publishers will see fit to
use its documents, suitably amended, as the basis for a similar
paperback publication in English - this would help to avoid the
delays inherent in ordering materials from England or the United
States.
L. C. Green
Department of Political Science
University of Alberta

Amnesty International Report on Torture. London: Duckworth,
1973. Pp. 224. $1.50, paperback.
As part of the 'celebrations' of Human Rights Day 1972 Amnesty
International, which has done so much on behalf of 'prisoners of
conscience', decided to launch an international campaign against
the governmental use of torture, and this Report is the result of
their survey into the position across the world.
Amnesty International is aware of the emotive character of
the word 'torture' and of the concomitant desire of those who use
it to find some pseudonym, although one might question the
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implication that 'interrogation in depth' necessarily amounts to the
same thing (p. 30). The nearest the Report gets to providing a
legal definition of torture is to reproduce the comment of the
European Commission of Human Rights in relation to the Greek
issue: "The word 'torture' is often used to describe inhuman
treatment, which has a purpose, such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, and it is
generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment. The notion of
inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as deliberately
causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which in the particular
situation is unjustifiable" (p. 31). The Report rightly points out
that the use of the concept of justifiability is most dangerous and
readily open to abuse, and indicates the necessity of bearing in
mind that cultural differences may result in what is regarded as
'torture' in one society proving acceptable in another. Kissing of
the crucifix is cited as an example. Amnesty also draws attention
to the dangers inherent in the demand of a government to be
entitled to use a 'sliding scale' of intensity in interrogation when it
considers its security to be at stake.
The most the Report can say is that "although there may be
grey areas in defining those acts that constitute torture, there can
be no misunderstanding about its unlawfulness. Under every relevant international legal document torture is prohibited" (pp. 33-4).
For those who are interested in defining the 'black' area the
discussion on medical and psychological aspects, together with the
personal accounts with which the Report is replete, may serve as a
guide. It must be remembered, however, that victims and their
friends are often also the willing 'victims' of hallucination and
exaggeration. Equally, care must be exercised when looking at
matters allegedly connected with medical experimentation. It is
perhaps surprising that while the Report condemns the United
States for indulging in 'degrading anal searches' for drugs both
before and after these were declared unconstitutional (p. 180),
there is no reference to the use of medical experiments within the
American prison system.
The Report deals with the use of torture in 61 countries, and
while it includes such 'advanced' states as Belgium, the Soviet
Union and the United States - surprisingly the prison systems of
France and Italy are ignored - it is pleasant to find that there is no
criticism of Canada. It is equally surprising to find that while there
are case studies of the position in Greece and Ulster, these are
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included in the chapter on 'Legal Remedies' and completely ignored in the 'World Survey of Torture'.
The Report concludes that "at present there exist few effective ways of stopping torture. We have seen that only in the case
of Greece was proof of torture authoritatively established by an
intergovernmental judicial enquiry. The Compton and the Amnesty
International investigations in Northern Ireland coincided in their
description of facts though they differed in the conclusions they
reached. South Africa and Brazil have received much international
attention, but their governments have instituted no special internal
enquiry to examine the use of torture, and sharply opposed any
suggestion of an enquiry from the outside. Amnesty International
has also investigated complaints from Aden and Israel. In none of
these cases, apart from Greece, did the international enquiries
receive cooperation from the local authorities" (p. 218). It would
be interesting to know why Amnesty International found it necessary, of all the middle Eastern belligerents or ex-belligerents, to
pick out Israel for special comment in this way. This reader would
have thought that the comments the Report makes on pages
211-214 show a governmental willingness to listen which is absent
from the reports concerning the Arab states, against which similar
or even more grave accusations of torture have been made.
In any compilation of this kind there is the fear of political
bias and subjectivity. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that any
person interested in the defence of human rights or the maintenance of the rule of law will find the Amnesty InternationalReport
on Torture one of the more reliable sources of ammunition for his
cause.
L. C. Green
Department of Political Science
University of Alberta

InternationalLegal Aspects of Federalism. By Ivan Bernier. London: Longman, 1973. Pp. xii, 308 $4.95
Professor Bernier of Universit6 Laval has written a masterly, though
tedious, appreciation of the classical and contemporary international
legal aspects of federalism. Given recent tendencies toward international integration, itself a federalizing process, Bernier's task was not
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only to reconsider the international status of federations and their
sub-units, but also to explore the relevance of that body of international law associated with federalism to such integrative efforts as the
European Communities. Either objective would have been sufficient
in itself; combining both in one book courted some potential risks.
Happily, the author has succeeded in melding the two themes in one
unified study. His scholarship is thorough in his command of both the
publicists and the cases. The book is certainly timely for Canadian
readers in view of the continuing controversy over the international
role of the provinces.
Part One deals with such traditional international problems
faced by federal states as personality, responsibility and immunity; while Part Two considers federalism and evolving international
law and their mutual impact. Part One deals with the experiences of
Germany, Switzerland, the United States, the Soviet Union and
Canada in so far as their federal organization is internationally significant. Part Two, necessarily more speculative, is confined mostly
to the evolving European Communities.
Bernier's discussion of the traditional international legal aspects
of federalism gives disproportionate prominence to the disputations
of nineteenth century European publicists and insufficient attention
to more recent developments, particularly the Vienna Conference on
the Law of Treaties held in 1968-69 and the Convention it produced.
The Conference is, of course, considered, but its significance is
blurred. However, inasmuch as the Conference ultimately settled
nothing as far as the international legal aspects of federalism are
concerned, Bernier's conclusions are clearly stated and as realistic as
can be expected.
As to whether the sub-units of federations enjoy international
status, the author rejects sovereignty-based theories and concludes
that whatever international rights and duties these entities possess
depends ultimately upon express constitutional delegation and international recognition. In reaching this conclusion, however, he relies
extensively on nineteenth-century Swiss and German experience.
Yet his own examination of cantonal and Lander 'treaties", upon
which our understanding of the law is based, indicates that their
subject matter differs little from those that American states and
Canadian provinces habitually conclude with each other. Few Canadian or American writers, however, regard these minor administrative arrangements as "treaties"; nor, for that matter, do the individuals who conclude them. Another difficulty is that the instances of
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cantonal and Linder transnational accords have declined dramatically over the years in contrast to the province-state agreements
which have mushroomed in this century, particularly in the 1960's
(16 Can. Pub. Admin. 481). Yet the North American practices
contribute little that is new to international law, though they have
served to reopen controversies thought to have been interred in the
nineteenth century. Indeed, Canadian authorities have been reluctant
to innovate in this field of law despite a greater need to do so than is
the case in any other contemporary federation.
There are a small number of minor factual errors in the discussion of province-state agreements. The 1962 Minnesota-Manitoba
highway accord (pp. 50-51, n. 198) is practically void, as the Manitoba authorities, at least, are loath to implement it. Also, contrary to
the assertion on p. 59, n. 244, the Quebec Order-in-Council authorizing that province's participation in the North Eastern Forest Fire
Protection Compact is No. 2497, not 2496. Moreover, the date of the
agreement's entry into force is disputable.
Bernier's interesting discussion of federalism and international
responsibility does not seem to be as clear as that in Hendry's Treaties
and Federal Constitutions (1955). More seriously, he fails to mention
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of other States (UNTS, Vol. 575, 1966, No.
8359) according to which the federation of Nigeria, for example,
could permit one of its constituent territories to be a party to an
international dispute. In addition, he appears to shift ground concerning the importance of federal constitutions for determining the international rights and duties of federal sub-units. In particular, his
discussion of responsibility in excess of competence lacks realism as
far as some Canadian provinces are concerned. Ottawa might refuse
to validate a provincial transnational agreement and yet lack the will
or the power or both to prevent the execution of the accord. In this
case, a province could deliberately attempt to exceed its competence
in a bid for enhanced international recognition. Finally, the conclusion of the chapter is somewhat overstated given the welter of views
and practices examined.
The chapter on federalism and international immunity is much
more satisfying. However, it could have been improved by a more
extended discussion of Canadian practices, particularly the status of
provincial offices and agents in London, Paris, New York, and
elsewhere.
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As a prelude to consideration of the new international
federations-in-process, Bernier reviews the well-known difficulties
faced by federal states in accepting international obligations. Refreshingly, he devotes even greater attention to such existing remedies as federal state clauses, plural representation at international
conferences and internal cooperation. The discussion, however, is
sometimes confused. While Bernier correlates each remedy with a
given state of socio-cultural integration, he fails to place them on the
continuum that his correlation logically suggests. Moreover, his
analysis of plural representation neglects the rich Canadian experience in United Nations, Commonwealth and francophone international bodies.
Bernier's transition to the international legal problems posed by
contemporary movements of supranational integration is effected
smoothly by his characterising federalism as a process rather than as a
static legal formula. Viewed thus, federalism is akin to functionalism
which is sometimes counterposed to the federal model for the purpose
of international integration. Although I fail to see the purpose of his
lengthy tracing of the federal idea, his account of the ways in which
the contemporary supranational "federations" deal with the traditional problems of personality, responsibility and immunity is clear
in the light of his discussion of classical federalism and international
law.
Finally, he ponders the nature of the law required to adjudicate
disputes between members of supranational organizations which are
not quite federal unions, but which are more integrated than international public organizations. If traditional international law is inadequate for the purpose, then perhaps the experience acquired by
federations in resolving the legal disputes of their territorial units is
more useful. While Bernier carefully avoids premature claims, he
does note a small though inconclusive amount of evidence that the
federal experience has been taken somewhat into account in solving
interstate disputes between members of supranational organizations.
Bernier's general conclusion is a masterfully precise summary
of the main points of the book. His association of federal law and
international law with different levels of societal integration is particularly noteworthy. In essence, he suggests that the more cohesive
international society becomes, states could more likely find themselves borrowing from the practices of federalism in resolving legal
problems that were hitherto international. However, he might have
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coined a more appropriate metaphor than "love-hate" for describing
the relationship between the two types of law.
In sum, Professor Bernier has contributed a very significant
work that should inspire clearer thinking on international legal problems that are not always well-understood. As a synthesis of previous
scholarship on the existing state of knowledge of the international
legal aspects of federalism, the book is indispensable. In the light of
this achievement, however, he might have been somewhat less modest in airing his own views because no new ground is broken in the
book. Moreover, a good deal of repetition could have been avoided.
Nevertheless, my criticisms of Bernier's volume are relatively minor
and I commend it highly.
Thomas Allen Levy
Department of Political Science
University of New Brunswick
The Brandon Packers Strike. By G. F. MacDowell. Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1971 $12.50.
The Brandon packers' strike of 1960 was, as Professor MacDowell
suggests, "a minor affair, involving only one hundred and ten
employees"' and lasting six months, but it is the basis for a most
interesting case study. A wondrous selection of "classic" factors and
some "specials" were involved. A modest, one-man company was
sold to "financiers" and, a young ambitious manager was appointed,
ready and willing to break the established pattern of collective bargaining on the ground that the company cold not afford to pay the
union demands. There was tension within the union local between the
"old guard" and the" new guard". There were allegations that union
officials had misled the membership about the company's last offer,
and there was an attempt by the company to negotiate directly with
the employees, by-passing the union. The strike was legal but the
strikers were dismissed and, finally, the strike was marked by violence which resulted in minor criminal convictions.
Mr. Justice Tritschler of the Manitoba Court of Appeal was
appointed by the Provincial government to conduct a Commission of
Inquiry, which resulted not only in the condemnation of the union
1. The Brandon Packers Strike, p. ix.
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leadership but also revealed financial manipulations by the "financier" owners of the company which led to their conviction on charges
of conspiracy to defraud in the making of a false prospectus.
The purposes of Professor MacDowell's study, he says, "are to
examine the events of the labour dispute; to analyze the issues in the
light of the legislation and law; and to illustrate the sources of
problems and conflicts by presenting diverse views of the issues.' '2
The strike at Brandon Packers does provide an excellent vehicle for
all of this, but the aims are pursued in a rather disjointed fashion.
Professor MacDowell has fully familiarized himself with the
law governing the various institutions of the labour relations system
which were involved in the Brandon packers' strike, as he demonstrates in Part I of his study. I found his essay on the functions of the
conciliation board particularly good. He has, however, an unfortunate tendency to stray into fascinating corners of the law, like judicial
review of arbitrators' decisions, that were not involved in any way in
the Brandon Packers' dispute. This exacerbates the main shortcoming of the book: a lack of coherent readability.
The structure of the work makes it hard going. Chapters are
elaborated by appendices and there are appendices to the book as a
whole. One chapter has an addendum and most of them end with
"summaries" which are not summaries at all but which elaborate and
complete the narrative. There is, it appears, a reason for this. In the
preface the author acknowledges his typist's "cheerfulness and optimistic belief that the study would be completed . . . when I was

frustrated and confused by the conflicting reports of publisher's
readers,". 3 If Professor MacDowell had simply ignored the
publisher's readers the study might have given up something in
balance and the effervescent value of being up to the minute, but
would have made a much more readable book.
These criticisms duly recorded, I must hasten to say that I found
it a highly stimulating exercise to work through The Brandon Packers
Strike. It can be hard going, but for the student of labour relations law
this careful examination of one particular dispute in its total context is
an informative exercise and for any lawyer the reading of this study
may well be an occasion for some fruitful introspection. This is,
perhaps, a rather personal judgment and may be dependent on the fact
that when the book came to hand I had just finished reading an article
2. Ibid., p. x.
3. Ibid., p. v.
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entitled "The Quest for Professional Competence' 4 by Dr. Andrew
Watson, a psychiatrist who has been involved for years in the process
of legal education. Against the backdrop of Watson's perceptive
criticism of the methods and results of legal education, Professor
MacDowell's study took on some special significance for me as a law
teacher.
At one level I realized that very good use could be made of The
Brandon Packers Strike and other studies like it in attacking one of
the problems in legal education noted by Watson; that of "factconsciousness". Legal realists, from Jerome Frank 5 to today's exponents of a clinical law school, 6 have impressed upon us that the
continual reading of appeal court judgments and, for that matter,
legal articles and texts, does not prepare the law student for realities
of law practice where he will be faced with unclassified slices of life
rather than "findings of fact". Exposure to the array of facts in
Professor MacDowell's study, not raw facts but facts assembled by
an economist rather than selected by a lawyer, could be very useful in
developing in students the professionally necessary sense of relevance.
There is, however, another level of significance in The Brandon
Packers Strike. A highly developed sense of relevance is a most
important tool in legal problem solving, but, as Dr. Watson suggests,
it does lead to a tendency to mentally mold the facts to a recognizable
pattern so that the problem solver can get on with the job of dealing
with "the legal issues". The very strong, usually unconscious,
tendency is, Watson suggests, to suppress "life facts" which might
make the legal solution unsatisfying. 7 The Brandon Packers Strike
provides an excellent corrective to this tendency.
Professor MacDowell's main source of material for his study
was the report of Mr. Justice Tritschler's Commission of Inquiry and
the transcript of proceedings before the Commission. MacDowell
puts before the reader passages from the transcript which the Commissioner regarded as irrelevant and in the chapter entitled "Setting
the Background" he paints a quite complete picture of the City of
Brandon, the firm, and the union, including many facts to which the
reaction of any lawyer will be that they are irrelevant. With Dr.
4.
5.
6.
7.

(1968), 37 Cincinnati Law Review 91.
A Plea for Lawyer-Schools (1947), 56 Yale L.J. 1305.
A Plea for Clinical Law (1972), 50 Can. Bar Rev. 183.
Watson, supra, footnote 4, pp. 101, 131 and especially 133-4.
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Watson freshly in mind, I found myself realizing that in a labour
dispute, where the central factors are human and economic, concentration on whether the preconditions specified for a given legal result
are satisfied or not leads to a very limited perception of what has
happened. For instance, the fact that the new owners of Brandon
Packers had fraudently removed thousands of dollars from the
company's account had nothing to do with the legality of the strike,
but would anyone other than a lawyer ignore that fact in assessing the
rights and wrongs of the union proceeding to a strike in the face of
management's protestations of inability to pay. Neither the employees, the union nor the manager knew of the fraud but in an expost
facto and legally irrelevant way it did vindicate the employees and
their union leaders in feeling that, in breaking away from the pattern
of bargaining in previous years, the manager was denying the employees "their fair share".
Exposure to "life facts" such as this would not only present a
law student with the kind of chaff of fact which he must learn to
separate from the wheat, it might also cause any member of the
profession to reflect profitably on the limitations of the lawyer's
sense of relevance.
Throughout The Brandon Packers Strike, and particularly in
chapter 5, entitled "The Conduct of the Inquiry", the author draws
upon the transcript of the inquiry to document charges of what he
calls misplaced "legalism". There are several illustrations which
might be thought to support, at the same time, a somewhat more
sophisticated charge levelled against lawyers by Dr. Watson, when
he says,
The possession of impressive intellectual capacities often
causes excessive use of the defense of intellectualization. This
is a psychological maneuver whereby persons relate to each
other and themselves primarily through ideas, even when emotional matters may be more pertinent. While this device is useful
for neutralizing anxiety, it is my impression that lawyers use it
to an extensive and inappropriate degree. It causes them to place
too much emphasis on the verbal aspects of communication and
not enough on the feeling-content and connotations which are
present. To make it worse, lawyers have a multitude of technical
tools, such as the rules of evidence, which reinforce that tendency. Their proclivity for playing semantic games is enough to
drive off many less hearty souls .... 8
A couple of examples must suffice. As is reported by Professor
MacDowell, the Commission of Inquiry into the Brandon packers'
8. Ibid., p. 113.
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strike did not, commence its hearings until after the parties had
reached a settlement so neither was anxious to co-operate. The
Commissioner was concerned about the usefulness of the inquiry,
and so, to quote from the study:
In the course of the hearings witnesses were encouraged to
express approval of the Commission, particularly from union
members who, indeed, were in no position to give informed
answers, since they could not know what evidence would be
adduced, what interpretation would be made of it, what
recommendations would be made, and what legislation would
result. For example after the sensible reply, 'Oh, I don't know
the outcome of the deal yet', Mr. Justice Tritschler interjected,
'Never mind the outcome of the deal. You have heard what has
developed so far, do you think it was advisable that information
be brought to light or would it have been better if it had been kept
hidden?' The obviously forced reply, 'Yes, I think it was a good
idea' was included in the report as proof of approval .9
One of the recommendations of the Commission was that there
should be legislation making unions sueable entities. The following
passage from the transcript resulted, ostensibly, from an attempt to
ascertain the opinion of the witness, Mr. Olver, on this matter. Mr.
Olver was the President of the Brandon local of the United Packing
House Workers of America, having been just elected the year of the
strike.
Mr. Arpin (Counsel to the Commission): There were statements
made at one time by one of the Union Officers, I believe it was
Teichrow, to the effect that the stuff that was coming out of
Brandon Packers was just rotten. Do you remember hearing
about that?
Mr. Arpin: And if it wasn't true it would be a most unfair thing
to say, right? Now you know yourself that if you are going to
spread out rumors or public statements, publish statements to
the effect that the products of the Company are rotten, well some
people are going to believe it and they're going to stop buying
and as a result of it the Companys (sic) going to suffer damages,
so it should be able, it should have the right and the means of
being compensated for the damages it suffered as a result of the
false statement. Right?
Mr. Olver: Yes.
Mr. Arpin: You think that is just unfair, that if anybody suffers
damages as a result of a wrong made by somebody else, he
should be given the right and the means of finding compensation
for it. Right?
Mr. Olver: I think they have. I think the law does cover that.
Mr. Arpin: You think so, eh? Now if it does not - suppose
somebody did that as a Union member for the purposes of the
9. The BrandonPackersStrike, p. 80, citing "evidence", p. 1148-9 and "Report",

p. 55.
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Union on strike, do you think the laws are adequate now to
permit the Company to get damages?
Mr. Olver: Oh, I think so, yes.
Mr. Arpin: Well, please tell us how you go about it.
Mr. Olver: I don't know, I'm not a lawyer, but I imagine they
are.

Mr. Tritschler: To cut it short you would have no objection to
the law, being, that a union should be responsible for matters of
this kind.
Mr. Olver: I don't think a Union should be responsible for all its
members. If I had five children and one of them went out and
broke a window, I couldn't hold the whole five of them responsible and I don't see that a Union should be held responsible. A
man can go out and, on his own and have nothing to do with the
Union at all.
Mr. Tritschler: If a local Union publishes false statements, in
official Union pamphlets, do you think the Union should be
responsible for those statements.
Mr. Olver: Oh yes. 10
Professor MacDowell comments that "this intrusion of legalism
was so insistent that the reader of the evidence (some 2,200 pages)
becomes prepared to agree with Dick's proposal, 'let's kill all the
lawyers'." 1 1 The passages quoted may not be convincing on this
score, although they do seem to illustrate Dr. Watson's point about
"intellectualization" and semantics.
Earlier in his book, in a more kindly frame of mind, Professor
MacDowell suggests merely that "labour relations are much too
serious to be left to lawyers". 12 He is not alone in thinking this, but I,
for one, am not at all persuaded that labour relations would be better if
lawyers were not involved. The laws regulating labour relations are
complex, not because lawyers want them to be but because a complex
human relationship cannot be effectively regulated by simplistic
laws. The complexity of the law calls for advice and problem solving
by legally trained people. The answer is not to get lawyers out of
labour relations, but to attempt to ensure that the lawyers who are in
labour relations are sensitive to the human and economic implications
of their work, to the usefulness of other forms of experience and
training and to the limitations of that mode of thought which is
peculiarly "legal",
Innis Christie
Dalhousie Law School
10. Ibid., p. 255.
11. Ibid., p. 254.
12. Ibid., p. 11.

